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IN GOD WE TRUST (UNLESS
WE CHANGE OUR MIND):
HOW STATE OF MIND
RELATES TO RELIGIOUS
ARBITRATION
Skylar Reese Croy
ABSTRACT
Arguably, binding religious arbitration agreements are constitutionally
problematic because they hinder freedom of religion: They inhibit parties’ ability to
change their beliefs. However, religious arbitration agreements also offer an outlet
for the religiously inclined to further practice their beliefs.
This Article offers a middle ground: If a party to a religious arbitration
agreement changes religion, he or she can claim a “conscientious objector” status if
he or she can prove the agreement violates his or her sincerely held religious beliefs.
Courts are allowed to inquire into the sincerity of a person’s religious beliefs. The
religious question doctrine—which restricts courts ability to decide questions of
religion—does not apply to sincerity determinations. Courts should view
conscientious objectors with skepticism in order to promote the national policies in
favor of arbitration, freedom of contract, and the prevention of fraud. Courts can
strike the proper balance between these policies and freedom of religion by using
similar standards to those found in military regulations regarding conscientious
objectors.
This Article’s primary focus is on how courts can use religious sincerity.
However, it ends by noting a second example of how state of mind can help avoid
tricky religious questions. Recently, a former member of the Church of Scientology
tried to escape a religious arbitration agreement by arguing it was unconscionable
because the arbitrators were scientologists and the church teaches that members
should shun those that leave. The court refused to look at whether the church actually
taught this. The former member should have argued the individual arbitrators were
biased, instead of focusing on church teachings. This Article concludes that the
distinction between what parties or arbitrators believe—i.e., their state of mind—and
what churches teach is a powerful tool.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Susan and Boaz Avitzur “were married on May 22, 1966, in a ceremony
conducted in accordance with Jewish tradition.”1 In keeping with Jewish custom, the
couple signed a marriage contract known as a ketubah.2 The couple declared in the
ketubah their “desire to . . . live in accordance with the Jewish law of marriage
throughout [their] lifetime.”3 Importantly, this ketubah included a religious
arbitration clause, which stated:
[We], the bride and bridegroom . . . hereby agree to recognize
the Beth Din of the Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish
Theological Seminary of America or its duly appointed
representatives, as having authority to counsel us in the light
of Jewish tradition which requires husband and wife to give
each other complete love and devotion, and to summon either
party at the request of the other, in order to enable the party so
requesting to live in accordance with the standards of the
Jewish law of marriage throughout his or her lifetime. We
authorize the Beth Din to impose such terms of compensation
as it may see fit for failure to respond to its summons or to
carry out its decisions.4
The New York Court of Appeals enforced the arbitration clause.5 It found
that the arbitration clause merely imposed a secular contract obligation.6 Religious
arbitration agreements, such as the Avitzurs’s, have grown in popularity.7 This rise
is primarily due to two factors: (1) the legal community’s acceptance of arbitration
more generally;8 and (2) the thinning of Judeo-Christian values from secular law,
1

Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983).
Id. See generally MICHAEL J. BROYDE, SHARIA TRIBUNALS, RABBINICAL COURTS, AND CHRISTIAN PANELS
51–56 (2017) (describing the complex nature of Jewish marriage contracts).
3
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
BROYDE, supra note 2, at 3 (“Although controversial, religious arbitration has grown immensely since
its inception. In fact, almost every religion in the United States has its own system for settling disputes,
each of which function as an alternative to the civil courts.”).
8
Id. at 5–6 (“Judges shunned arbitration for a number of reasons. The most often cited factors were that
arbitrators lack as robust an understanding of the law as judges, the lack of adequate judicial oversight of
the arbitration process, and the lack of a binding effect. As time went on, however, and the body
American contract law developed, courts became satisfied that individuals could contract with one another
to make their future disputes subject to arbitration.. Labor unions were one of the first groups to move in,
quickly embracing it and testing its structural soundness. . . Other groups then started occupying other
2
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which has caused Christian communities to seek their own dispute resolution
systems.9 U.S. Courts have generally enforced these arbitration agreements by
reasoning that religious arbitration agreements impose mere secular contract
obligations, just like the New York Court of Appeals did. 10
Nevertheless, civil court enforcement of religious arbitration agreements and
awards is particularly controversial.11 Opponents’ usual argument is that religious
arbitration relies on religious law that generally disadvantages women.12
Furthermore, they fear women may feel pressure from their religious communities to
submit to arbitration.13 Indeed, Ontario banned religious arbitration for family
disputes in 2006 following a quote from a Muslim leader that “‘good Muslims’
would be expected to subject their family law disputes to resolution by the Sharia
arbitration mechanism, rather than the state’s civil court system and its secular family
laws.”14 Of course, whether these arguments pass muster is questionable.15
parts of the house . . . . [A]s arbitrators specialized, groups of prospective arbitral parties were able to build
de facto court systems within which to settle their disputes . . . . As the class of arbitrable disputes grew, so
did the groups who embraced the practice. Merchants, employers, and banks all began implementing it in
some form or another.”).
9
Id. at 9 (“For some time, law in the United States was in very close alignment with Judeo-Christian values on
many issues (race being the huge area of tension). . . . As the laws and principles of Americans have continued
to develop in a more secular direction, these religious groups—especially Evangelical and mainline Protestant
communities— whose religious beliefs were once perfectly reflected in the law—have realized they are now
falling into the minority. . . . As secular law loses its Judeo-Christian roots, a trend that is likely to continue in
the coming years, the people still rooted in Judeo-Christian values and traditions will continue to find other
means for settling their disputes outside the court system . . . .”).
10
E.g., Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
501, 550 (2012) (citing Encore Prod. V. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo. 1999)) (“The court
took the view that the agreement to undergo religious arbitration was a question of civil contract law, so a court
could enforce it.”).
11
See generally id.
12
E.g., id. at 542; Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Religious
Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J. L. & REL. 379, 413 (2009) (“Another serious criticism that
is likely to be leveled at the use of Muslim religious tribunals in the United States is a concern over women’s
rights, especially women who are seen as particularly vulnerable, such as recent immigrants or those in abusive
relationships.”).
13
E.g., Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, Religious Tribunals, and the Democratic
Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 231, 241 (2011).
14
Id. at 241; see also Tabassum Fahim Ruby, The Question of Muslim Women’s Rights and the Ontario
Shari’ah Tribunals, 34 FRONTIERS 134, 142–43 (2013) (discussing the perception of many Canadians that
Muslim women were victims).
15
“Public outcry against religious arbitration has, thus far, been confined to ‘Islamophobia’ as there has not
been an equivalent public reaction to more well-established Jewish or Christian versions of religious
arbitration.” Aric Birdsell, Note, Hosanna-Tabor and Culture Gap: A Case for Settling Church & Minister
Employment Disputes Through Religious Arbitration, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.. 519, 545 (2013) (citing
Harvey Simmons, One Law for All Ontarians, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 14, 2010,
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/860513-- one-lawfor-all-ontarians); see also Bambach,
supra note 12, at 413. Furthermore, one scholar has questioned whether civil courts are “better” for so-called
“vulnerable” Muslim women. Ruby, supra note 14, at 149 (“Through the notion of gender equality opponents
reproduced the notion of the ‘vulnerable’ Muslim woman who was a victim of her religion and in need of the
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However, this Article focuses on a newer, less addressed argument.
Nicholas Walter, in an article published by the Santa Clara Law Review, has
argued that religious arbitration infringes religious freedom.16 Specifically, Mr.
Walter has argued that people have a constitutional right to change their religious
beliefs.17 If a court requires someone who has changed his or her beliefs to undergo
religious arbitration, the court subjects that person to a religious proceeding,
arguably violating the Free Exercise Clause.18 Mr. Walter has taken this argument
so far as to suggest “religious arbitrations have a deterrent effect on people changing
faith” and thus, that religious arbitration agreements should not be enforced even if
no party is claiming to have changed religions.19
Ultimately, this Article concludes that courts must allow some exception to
otherwise binding religious arbitration agreements and awards for conscientious
objectors thus addressing Mr. Walter’s concern.20 This Article borrows the term
“conscientious objector” from military regulations, which allow servicemembers to
receive discharges—and thus escape contractual obligations—for religious beliefs.
In the military realm, proving conscientious objector status is no easy task.21 This
Article argues that courts should have a similar skepticism for conscientious
objectors to religious arbitration. Because parties need some predictability in order
to manage their expectations and contract accordingly, courts should generally
enforce religious arbitration agreements. Other policies, such as the policies in favor
of arbitration and the prevention of fraud, can also be encouraged by such
skepticism.
protection offered by the tropes of liberal sensibilities. This position veiled the reality that the alternative
offered to faith-based arbitration was a family court system that was already difficult to access for many
women, particularly those with fewer economic resources. Critics overlooked the social realities of Muslim
women (and men) and argued that state laws were the best mode available to protect the rights of Muslim
women. This claim characterized the tropes of liberal sensibilities as neutral, as if such techniques would shield
Muslim women from racism and sexism and as if Muslim women would automatically embrace civil laws over
religious laws upon immigrating to Canada.”).
16
Walter, supra note 10, at 547–52.
17
Id.
18
Id. Some commentators have discussed possible Establishment Clause concerns as well. See, e.g.,
Birdsell, supra note 15, at 546. However, “[c]ourts have consistently held that the enforcement of
religious arbitration awards by secular courts poses no Establishment Clause concerns. Mandatory
arbitration agreements have been consistently upheld as well.” Id. Contra Brian Hutler, Religious
Arbitration and the Establishment Clause, 33 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 337, 338 (2018) (“[T]he
enforcement of religious arbitration agreements may constitute a delegation to religious institutions of a
core governmental function, namely, the adjudication and enforcement of the private law.”).
19
Walter, supra note 10, at 551. Mr. Walter does allow for religious arbitration of questions that courts would
be prohibited from answering under the religious question doctrine. Id. at 553–54. He finds this exception
acceptable because of necessity: Someone has to resolve the dispute. Id. Problematically for his exception, its
constitutionality probably cannot turn on mere necessity.
20
Id. at 551.
21
John H. Matheson, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/912/conscientious-objection-to-militaryservice.
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys responses to Mr. Walter’s
argument in the scholarly literature. Part II explains a novel counterargument:
Courts can determine religious sincerity. The religious question doctrine—which
limits courts’ ability to decide religious questions—does not apply.22 Part III
explains how a court could perform a conscientious objector analysis in the context
of religious arbitration. Part IV addresses two counterarguments. First, it explains
why allowing religious sincerity determinations in the context of religious
arbitration will not create a flood of people hoping to escape. Second, it explains
why the religious question doctrine does not apply to religious sincerity
determinations.
This Article concludes that state of mind determinations—such as
determining sincerity—do not invoke the religious question doctrine and have a
place in religious arbitration literature. This Article’s conclusion briefly describes
another state of mind determination—bias. Courts can determine whether a religious
arbitrator is biased because a party has left the arbitrator’s faith without invoking the
religious question doctrine.23 In summary, mental state is a powerful and unexplored
tool in the world of religious arbitration.
II.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION MEETS RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

This part explains how scholars and litigants have reacted to Mr. Walter’s
argument. His argument has gone mostly unaddressed, despite being noted, with the
exception of one article discussed below.24 Indeed, the weight of scholarly literature
argues that freedom of religion is promoted by enforcing religious arbitration
agreements, yet his argument stands without a proper counter.

A.

Mixed Messages from Professor Broyde

Professor and Rabbi Michael J. Broyde’s acclaimed book, Sharia Tribunals,
Rabbinical Court, and Christian Panels, has an entire chapter that is nothing but a
summary of the background section of Mr. Walter’s article.25 The chapter contains
sixty-eight citations, all to Mr. Walter’s article.26 Later in the book, without
acknowledging Mr. Walter as the source, he stated Mr. Walter’s argument “raises
serious questions about whether and to what extent secular enforcement of religious
arbitration can be achieved without seriously abridging individuals’ rights to freely
22

See generally Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185 (2017).
Jeff Dasteel, Religious Arbitration Agreements in Contracts of Adhesion, 8 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION
45, 63–64 (2016).
24
Broyde, infra note 31.
25
BROYDE, supra note 2, at 71–82.
26
Id.
23
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choose, change, and practice religion as their own consciences dictate.”27 He
acknowledged the force of an argument analogous to Mr. Walter’s by scholar Ayelet
Shachar that ordering a Jewish husband “to appear before a rabbinical court . . .
would have been ‘an impermissible breach of the husband’s constitutionally
protected freedom of religion.’”28 The book, unfortunately, did little more than
acknowledge the argument.29 In one recent article authored by Professor Broyde, he
walked through various arguments against religious arbitration, and even though
Professor Broyde again cited Mr. Walter’s article, he did not address its underlying
argument.30 One of the few responses to Mr. Walter’s argument occurs in a mere
footnote toward the end of another article by Professor Broyde:
The question of whether religious arbitration of secular
matters could and should be prohibited by statute is discussed .
. . [by Mr.] Walter . . . and he concludes that such arbitration
should be prohibited.
Putting aside the religious
discrimination problem of the government allowing all
arbitration other than religious arbitration, I think the policy
concerns that he worries about—that religious arbitration
curtails the right of people to change their faith (the “exit”
problem)—strikes me as not important when religious
arbitration is viewed as just another form of contract. Of
course, by contract, one can and does abandon deeply held
constitutional rights and loses one’s right to change one’s
mind. A person by contract can forsake his right to work as a
journalist (a First Amendment right), to bear arms (a Second
Amendment right), the right to a jury trial (a Seventh
Amendment right), and many other rights. Free exercise
rights are no more jeopardized by enforcing contracts for
religious arbitration than contractual waiver of a right to trial
by jury endangers jury trial rights.31
Notably, this footnote is at odds with Professor Broyde’s book. More importantly for
this Article, Professor Broyde’s footnote does not engage with Mr. Walter’s
argument that freedom of religion is different from other rights because it is
27

Id. at 233; accord Walter, supra note 10.
BROYDE, supra note 2, at 233 (quoting Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from
Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 573, 595 n.52 (2008)).
29
Id.
30
Michael J. Broyde, Playground Resurfacing and Religious Arbitration Are Very Similar Activities:
Trinity Lutheran Church as Applied to Religious Arbitration, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & REL. 298 (2017).
31
Michael J. Broyde, Faith-Based Private Arbitration as a Model for Preserving Rights and Values in a
Pluralistic Society, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111, 139 n.122 (2015).
28
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inalienable.32 Mr. Walter pointed out that James Madison painstakingly:
explain[ed] why the right to religion was inalienable. It was
inalienable both because “the opinions of men, depending only
on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot
follow the dictates of other men;” and because it is the “duty
of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such
only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”33
As Mr. Walter’s explained, the U.S. Supreme Court has often used James
Madison’s language—that freedom of religion “is in its nature an unalienable
right.”34

B.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Solution

Professor Jeff Dasteel proposed a solution, similar to this Article’s, in order
to address Mr. Walter’s argument: Use the RFRA.35 The RFRA, in relevant part,
states:

(a)

In General
Government shall not substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided
in subsection (b).

(b) Exception Government may substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means for furthering that
compelling governmental interest.36

32

Walter, supra note 10, at 548–49.
Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 48, 50 (John J. Patrick &
Gerald P. Long eds., 1999)) (emphasis added).
34
Id. at 548 & n.319 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.38 (1985); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 12 (1947); id. at 37 & App. (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Walz v. Comm’n, 397 U.S. 705 & App. II (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
35
Jeff Dasteel, supra note 23, at 45. However, he does not cite Mr. Walter. Id.
36
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2018).
33
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In addition to the RFRA, he argued, “where there is a sincere religious
objection to religious arbitration in a contract of adhesion and the court is prevented
from ruling on that objection due to the non-interference doctrine, the court should
abstain from ruling on the application to compel arbitration.”37 For example,
Professor Dasteel considered the Garcia case, discussed below.38 In this case, one of
the major issues was whether the arbitrators were biased given that the plaintiff had
left the church of Scientology and that the arbitrators were scientologists.39 The
plaintiff, unwisely, framed his argument in terms of church doctrine: that
scientologists were taught to be biased against him for leaving.40 Instead of deciding
whether the arbitrators were biased, Professor Dasteel would have had the judge
abstain from deciding the case at all, out of fear that the inquiry would necessarily
entail looking at church teachings.41 This Article argues that bias is a state of mind,
and thus a court does not have to look into religious teachings.
On a final note, Professor Dasteel, while discussing some cases, made very
little effort, unlike this Article, to discuss what a sincerely held belief looked like.42
He does say those wishing to escape must have a “good faith belief.”43 After
discussing some cases, he merely states, “a court can assess whether a party asserts
the RFRA as a defense to compelling religious arbitration based on that party’s
sincere religious beliefs as a matter of factual inquiry, something courts are able to
do and have done with some frequency in the past.”44

C.

The “Court” of Scientology

In addition to scholars, litigants have also jumped on Mr. Walter’s
argument.45 Parties hoping to escape religious arbitration agreements have recently
started to use it—at least when talking to the media.46 For example, Luis Garcia, a
37

Dasteel, supra note 23, at 60.
Id. at 56-60.
39
See Part VI for a more detailed discussion.
40
See infra Part VI.
41
Dasteel, supra note 23, at 65 (“If a party to a contract of adhesion contends that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable on religious grounds, the court cannot make a ruling on unconscionability. Thus, in Garcia, if
the determination of whether to grant Scientology’s application to compel arbitration turned on whether the
religious arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionability [sic], and that determination required
determination of an ecclesiastical issue, then the court should refrain from both making the determination of
substantive unconscionability and abstain from deciding the motion to compel arbitration.”).
42
Id. at 63–65.
43
Id. at 66.
44
Id. at 64.
45
See generally Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religiousarbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html.
46
Id. (“Some plaintiffs counter that it is their First Amendment rights being infringed because they must
38
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former member of the Church of Scientology, sued the church for fraud, demanding
it return “roughly $68,000 he had paid the church for training courses he never took
and other expenses . . . [and] also demanding that the church return $340,000 he said
his family had given for the construction of a ‘Super Power’ building in Clearwater,
Fla.”47 The church moved, successfully, to enforce a religious arbitration clause.48
Mr. Garcia complained to the New York Times, “I am being forced to go before a
court run by a religion I no longer believe in . . . . How could that happen?”49 Mr.
Garcia’s complaint was essentially the same argument that Mr. Walter’s presented in
his article: parties have a right to change their religions and courts should not
interfere.50

D.

The Need for Balance

Mr. Walter’s argument needs to be addressed head-on. Problematically, it
has been either accepted or rejected in its totality.51 Such is often and unfortunately
the case with religious accommodations in general.52 As Professor Shachar
explained in the 1990s, multiculturalist literature generally argued either for or
against accommodations.53 She argued nations must move away from “all-ornothing” approaches to accommodations and recognize that some accommodations
have significant value to society while at the same time realizing accommodations
can hurt individuals.54 The proper balance must be struck.55 This Article is a step in
that direction. The United States can support religious arbitration generally and at
the same time have an escape mechanism for those with legitimate religious
objections.

unwillingly participate in what amounts to religious activity.”).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See generally id.
51
See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
(2001).
52
See id. at 85.
53
See id.
54
Id. (“This chapter has sought to expose the fundamental problems underlying current theoretical and
legal paradigms for dividing jurisdiction over individuals with multiple affiliations. They share one basic
misguided assumption: that group members cannot be simultaneously subject to more than one source of
legitimate legal authority. Whether explicitly or implicitly, current legal and theoretical thinking tends to
assume that either the state or the group should exclusively govern group members’ affairs.”). Id.
Notably for this Article’s purpose, Professor Shachar noted the need for what she called “reversal points.”
Id. at 122. In other words, she believed there needed to be certain ways by which a member of a group
could “opt out.” Id. at 122–23.
55
Id.
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III. UNCLE SAM AS THE JUDGE OF RELIGIOUS SINCERITY
Courts can achieve a middle ground by using religious sincerity.56 Mr.
Walter stated, “[A] court would not seek proof that someone who had agreed to enter
into Christian arbitration, was in fact, a Christian. In any case, such an inquiry—
determining the status of a party’s religion—would likely contravene the religious
question doctrine.”57 Mr. Walter is wrong, and this part of the Article lays the
groundwork for understanding why. It begins with an overview of military
conscientious objectors. Next, it discusses other kinds of religious sincerity inquiries
in order to show such inquiries are quite common.

A.

Military Conscientious Objectors

Military conscientious objector status represents, perhaps, the ultimate
religious accommodation.58 Before conscientious objector status, government
overreach in the name of war was substantial.59 Conscientious objector status, as it is
understood today, has its origins in the 1917 Draft Act.60 Prior to this point in
history, those with religious objections to military service had little recourse.61
During the Civil War, “the Enrollment Act of 1863 allow[ed] draftees to pay $300
to a substitute who served for them.”62 The Enrollment Act did little good for the
common man, and in reality, it was mostly just a way for the rich to dodge military
service.63 Prominent men, such as Grover Cleveland, the future President, and John
D. Rockefeller, took advantage of the Enrollment Act.64 The 1917 Draft Act did a
similarly poor job of helping the common man with religious objections.65 “In
effect, . . . [its] exemption was limited to members of the historic peace
churches.”66 Members of the Mennonite faith who refused to serve were often sent
to hard labor camps.67 In a letter, one Mennonite wrote:
56

See generally Walter, supra note 10, at 549.
Id.
Matheson, supra note 21.
59
Timothy G. Todd, Note, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1734, 1734 (1969).
60
See id.
61
Michael T. Meier, Civil War Draft Records: Exemptions and Enrollments, GENEALOGY NOTES, Winter
1994, https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1994/winter/civil-war-draft-records.html.
62
Id.
63
Matheson, supra note 21.
64
Meier, supra note 61.
65
Donald Eberle, The Plain Mennonite Face of the World War One Conscientious Objector, 3 J. AMISH &
PLAIN ANABAPTIST STUD. 175, 178 (2015).
66
Todd, supra note 59, at 1734.
67
As one scholar noted:
A total of 20,873 men made conscientious objector claims to their local boards,
and were subsequently inducted into the army. Just 3,989 of these men actually
57
58
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Today some of us had the hardest experience that we have had
since we came to camp. We were cursed, beaten, kicked, and
compelled to go through exercises to the extent that a few
were unconscious for some minutes. They kept it up the
greater part of the afternoon, and then those who could
possibly stand on their feet were compelled to take cold
shower baths. One of the boys was scrubbed with a scrubbing
brush, using lye on him. They drew blood in several places.68
Before the United States entered World War II, Congress passed the
Selective Service Act of 1940, which “broadened the conscientious objection
exemption.”69 Today, individuals may not only escape military service by gaining
conscientious objector status but may also sign away their souls to Uncle Sam and
then change their minds.70 Department of Defense Directive (“DoDD”) 1300.06
explains:
a. Service member may be granted an administrative
separation, or restriction of military duties, due to
conscientious objection before completing his or her obligated
term of service based on the Service member’s respective
Military Department’s judgment of the facts and
circumstances in the case.
***
d. Due to the personal and subjective nature of conscientious
objection, the existence, honesty, and sincerity of asserted
conscientious objections cannot be determined by applying
inflexible objective stands and measurements on an “acrossthe-board” basis.
***
b. A primary factor to be considered is the sincerity with
which the religious, moral, or ethical belief is held. Great care
claimed conscientious objector status in camp. Certainly, the physical and mental
duress and “inhuman treatment” designed to test the “genuineness” of their
convictions convinced many to drop their claim.
Eberle, supra note 65.
68
Letter reprinted in JONAS SMUCKER HARTZLER, MENNONITES IN THE WORD WAR: OR, NONRESISTANCE
UNDER TEST 123 (1921).
69
Todd, supra note 59, at 1734–35.
70
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.06 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS (2017) (emphasis added).
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must be exercised in seeking to determine whether asserted
beliefs are honestly and genuinely held.
(1) Sincerity is determined by an impartial evaluation
of the applicant’s thinking and living in its
totality, past and present.71
Such an out for conscientious objectors is necessary in order to prevent the
substantial government overreach of the past from reoccurring.72 However, it also
presents the kind of accommodation that is most problematic: one with substantial
externalities.73 Indeed, it is hard to think of a public policy more important than
having sufficient soldiers during wartime. Furthermore, it may be unfair to let some
people avoid the draft merely on religious grounds, requiring others to fight in their
place.74 “Both advocates and critics of multiculturalism have given much attention
to the potential for accommodation to erode the social unity of already diverse
polities. They are quite reasonably concerned that such societies will lose whatever
‘social glue’ holds their citizens together.”75
Nevertheless, the current regulation is quite clear: A service member can
receive a discharge for a change in religious beliefs but only after a substantial
inquiry into the sincerity of the beliefs.76 The fact that society is willing to bear this
cost has two implications for this Article. First, religious arbitration, in general,
seems like a minor accommodation. Second, someone with a legitimate objection to
religious arbitration should seemingly be able to change his or her mind.

B.

United States v. Seeger

Various religious accommodation cases trace their origin back to a case
interpreting the Universal Military Training and Service Act, called United States v.
Seeger.77 During the Vietnam War, Daniel Andrew Seeger had been convicted of
“refus[ing] to submit to induction in the armed forces.”78 The case was one of
statutory, and not constitutional, interpretation.79 The Court had to interpret, inter
71

See DoDD 1300.06 (2017).
See id.
73
See id.
74
Matheson, supra note 21.
75
SHACHAR, supra note 51, at 1.
76
See DoDD 1300.06 (2017).
77
See generally United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). For example, the case discussed infra, Kay
v. Bemis, cites Snyder v. Murray City Corp., which in turn cites Seeger.
78
Id. at 166.
79
Id. at 176. However, the Second Circuit decided a section of the law in question was unconstitutional
because it “discriminate[d] against those whose sincere objection to war [wa]s founded upon grounds
72
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alia, the phrase “religious training and belief.”80 The majority explained, as a
threshold matter, a religious belief had to be “sincere.”81 The Court emphasized the
subjective nature of sincerity and how it is different from whether a person’s beliefs
are correct:
The validity of what . . . [the objector] believes cannot be
questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners,
might be tempted to question the existence of the registrant’s
“Supreme Being” or the truth of his concepts. But these are
inquiries foreclosed to Government. “Men may believe what
they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are
as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.”
Local [draft] boards and courts in this sense are not free to
reject beliefs because they consider them “incomprehensible.”
Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own
scheme of things, religious.82
The takeaway from Seeger is that sincerity cannot be based on the
correctness or perceived validity of one’s beliefs.83 Furthermore, as Justice William
Douglas explained in his concurrence, questions and doubts are natural and thus not
alone sufficient to find a lack of sincerity.84

C.

Other Areas Where Courts Inquire into Religious Sincerity

However,
Notably, Seeger was a statutory interpretation case.85
constitutional claims often have a religious sincerity inquiry as well. Inquiries into
religious sincerity are common in various areas of law.86 In addition to conscientious
objection status, other areas of law where religious sincerity is judged include:

other than belief in a Supreme Being.” Todd, supra note 59, at 1738 (citing United States v. Seeger, 326
F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1964)). “The Supreme Court refused to rule on the constitutional issues raised by
Seeger.” Id.
80
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 at 176.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 184–85 (internal citations omitted).
83
Id. at 176.
84
Id. at 193. (Douglas, J., concurring) (“His questions and doubts on theological issues, and his wonder,
are no more alien to the statutory standard than are the awe-inspired questions of a devout Buddhist.”).
85
Id. at 163.
86
See Generally Chapman, supra note 22, at 1188.
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“fraud; immigration; employment discrimination; [and] prisoner religious
accommodations.”87
The prisoner accommodation cases are particularly intriguing. For example,
Karl Dee Kay was a prisoner at the Bonneville Community Correctional Facility in
Utah.88 He filed a lawsuit alleging, inter alia, First Amendment violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.89 He made three allegations relevant to this Article: First, he claimed
that corrections “officials not only denied his requests for tarot cards but also
confiscated them from him on two occasions when he brought them into [the
correctional facility] ‘without permission.’”90 Second, Mr. Kay claimed corrections
officials disciplined him for these incidents.91 Third, Mr. Kay alleged that
corrections officials “prohibited him from purchasing incense, and books with
references to magic or witchcraft on the cover.”92
As the district court judge explained, “[t]he first questions in any free
exercise claim are whether a plaintiff’s beliefs are religious in nature, and whether
those religious beliefs are sincerely held.”93 In other words, a threshold question in
the case was determining what Mr. Kay actually believed.94 The court held the
complaint did “not allege facts showing that he was denied a reasonable opportunity
to exercise his sincerely held religious beliefs.”95
The district court erred by concluding the complaint failed to state a claim.96
It based its holding on the fact that the complaint did not identify Mr. Kay’s religious
affiliation.97 It also noted that the complaint did “not allege any facts from which
one could conclude that his beliefs are sincerely held,” nor did the complaint allege
“any facts showing that the items allegedly denied to him—tarot cards, incense, and
books about magic or witchcraft—are necessary to the practice his religion.”98
The Tenth Circuit noted on appeal that, as a preliminary matter, the trial
judge was simply wrong—the complaint clearly stated Mr. Kay identified as a
Wiccan.99 More importantly, however, the court took issue with how the district
court reached its religious sincerity determination given the case’s procedural
posture:
87

Id.
Kay v. Bemis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6392 (D. Utah 2007), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 500 F.3d
1214.
89
Id. at *1.
90
Id. at *3.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at *7 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated in part by
159 F.3d 1227 (1998)) (emphasis added).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at *7.
98
Id. at *8.
99
Kay, 500 F.3d at 1219.
88
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The inquiry into the sincerity of a free-exercise plaintiff’s
religious beliefs is almost exclusively a credibility
assessment, . . . and therefore the issue of sincerity can
rarely be determined on summary judgment,” let alone a
motion to dismiss . . . . We have said that summary
dismissal on the sincerity prong is appropriate only in the
“very rare case[]” in which the plaintiff’s beliefs are “so
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation that they are
not entitled to First Amendment protection.” . . .
[I]t is unnecessary for [Mr.] Kay to show that the use of
tarot cards and the other items were “necessary” to the
practice of his religion if his belief in their use was sincerely
held.100
Other cases have sanctioned similar inquiries.101 Of note, these cases often
cite Seeger, discussed above.102
The Tenth Circuit did note a circuit split relevant to this Article: Other
circuits have considered the necessity or centrality of an accommodation to a sincere
belief.103 The problem with determining necessity, however, is that it borders along
the edge of the religious question doctrine.104 As the Tenth Circuit noted, “courts
have rightly shied away from attempting to gauge how central a sincerely held belief
is to the believer’s religion.”105
IV. UNCLE SAM CAN SOLVE MR. WALTER’S CONCERN
Recall that Mr. Walter’s primary concern with religious arbitration was that
it limited religious freedom by constraining parties’ ability to change or abandon
their religious beliefs.106 However, because courts can inquire into the sincerity of
religious beliefs, Mr. Walter’s concern is of limited significance. This Part draws on
military regulations for determining conscientious objector status ultimately arguing
courts could make a similar inquiry in order to determine whether someone should
100

Id. at 1219–20 (quoting Snyder, 124 F.3d at 1352–53).
E.g., Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The prisoner must show at the
threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.”); Ford v.
McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588–91 (2d Cir. 2003).
102
Ford, 352 F.3d at 588 (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)).
103
Kay, 500 F.3d at 1220 (citing Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997)).
104
See generally Walter, supra note 10, at 523.
105
Kay, 500 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007)).
106
See generally Walter, supra note 10, at 549-52.
101
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be released from a religious arbitration agreement. The burden on a party seeking to
exit a religious arbitration agreement ought to be high in order to further three
policies: (1) the national policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements; (2)
freedom of contract; and (3) the prevention of fraud. 107 Thankfully, as this part
shows, the standard relied on by the military is quite difficult to meet.

A.

The Military’s Eight Step Process
The military uses an eight-step process:
[1.] The service member submits an application for
conscientious objector status [to the commanding
officer.]
[2.] The commanding officer . . . assigns a military
chaplain and a psychiatrist to conduct required
interviews.
[3.] The applicant’s commanding officer appoints an
investigating officer.
[4.] The investigating officer holds an informal
hearing.
[5.] The investigating officer prepares a report,
including a recommendation to approve or deny the
application.
[6.] The commanding officer reviews the record and
makes a recommendation to approve or deny the
application.
[7.] [The] authorized official or board [reviews the
record and] makes the final decision [to either
approve or deny the application] and informs the
commanding officer.
[8.] The commanding officer . . . informs the applicant
of the final decision. 108

A few takeaways are important from this process. First, note that the
process involves a religious expert, the chaplain, and a mental health professional,
107
Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (stating that §§ 9–11 of the Federal
Arbitration Act should be read as substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with limited review
needed to maintain arbitration’s essential function of resolving disputes).
108
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: NUMBER OF FORMALLY REPORTED
APPLICATIONS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IS SMALL RELATIVE TO THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE ARMED
FORCES12–13 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/assets/270/267693.pdf.
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the psychiatrist, who makes reports that are a part of the official record.109 The use
of these professionals must be with great care: religious sincerity determinations are
not to reference accuracy or implausibility.110 The experts are there to help
determine the credibility of the purported beliefs, but they have to understand what
they are allowed to consider in their roles.111 The chaplain’s report is merely an
“opinion on the sincerity and depth of the applicant’s conviction . . . .”112 Similarly,
the psychiatrist’s report is a medical evaluation.113
Second, “[t]he applicant must present clear and convincing evidence of
meeting all of the criteria for conscientious objector status.”114 They must meet this
burden on three separate elements: “(1) they are opposed to participation in any form
of war; (2) their opposition is based on religious ethical, or moral beliefs; and (3)
their beliefs are sincere and deeply held.”115
The first element means that a servicemember cannot be a “selective
conscientious objector.”116 In other words, the applicant must oppose all war.117 For
example, a Muslim could not object to war with a primarily Muslim nation on the
ground that Muslims believe it is wrong to kill other Muslims.118 The other two
elements relate to the nature and significance of the belief.119 Likely, any successful
applicant will have to show these two elements by evidence of change in his or her
life.120 Recall Department of Defense Instruction 1300.06 states that “[s]incerity is
determined by an impartial evaluation of the applicant’s thinking and living in its
totality, past and present.”121 This statement suggests that how the applicant’s life
has changed is critical.122 What triggered the change? Did the applicant start
attending religious ceremonies? Did the applicant begin going to Bible study? How
significant was this life event? Are there witnesses that can attest the applicant has
been reading a holy book for a significant period? Has the applicant voiced concern
to witnesses over a prolonged period?
109

Id.
See generally Chapman, supra note 22, at 1185.
111
See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108, at 12.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 13.
115
Id. at 6.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See Liz Halloran, Will Hassan Case Prompt New Look at Objector Rules?, NPR (Nov. 13, 2009, 8:05 AM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120354216.
119
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108, at 1–2.
120
Id. For example, a servicemember might point to a conversion to a different religion.
121
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.06 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS (2017) (emphasis added).
122
DoDD 1300.06 at 7 (when outlining what the application must include, the instruction states “(2) How the
applicant’s beliefs changed or developed to include an explanation as to what factors (how, when, and from
whom or from what source training was received or belief acquired) caused the change in or development of
conscientious objector beliefs.”).
110
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Perhaps one of the more telling examples of a change is the story of Joshua
Casteel, who the Smithsonian has labeled, “The Priest of Abu Ghraib.”123 Mr.
Casteel was a young 24-year-old interrogator in a military intelligence unit.124 Mr.
Casteel deployed to Abu Ghraib a mere “six weeks after the revelation[s] of prisoner
torture and abuse . . . shocked the world.”125 Notably, shortly before the deployment,
Mr. Casteel had been accepted to the seminary.126 He already had doubts about war
at this point, but he figured he could do it nonetheless.127 In an email, he explained
he felt he could bring a sense of “moral order to the interrogation room.”128
Mr. Casteel soon realized how naïve he had been.129 He began to feel “an
overwhelming burden to atone for what . . . [he] considered the sin of reducing
individuals to strategic ‘objects of exploitation.’”130 He began seeking out a chaplain
after each and every interrogation to hear his confession.131 He stopped eating lunch
with his compatriots, choosing instead to eat with locals.132 He yo-yoed in weight,
he smoked, and he drank “excessive amounts of coffee,” in an attempt to relieve his
stress.133 “He stayed up late reading because he didn’t want the next day to
come.”134 Reportedly, “[h]e read so much that even during mortar attacks he
shopped for new books on Amazon.”135 Typically, the books Mr. Casteel was
reading had to do with “Christian pacifism.”136 Mr. Casteel was able to identify a
specific moment his worldview, which permitted war, came crashing down: he asked
a prisoner, “[w]hy did you come to Iraq to kill,” and the prisoner rhetorically asked
him the same question.137 Mr. Casteel continued the interrogation, but had to stop
shortly after and tell his superiors someone else needed to take over.138 He later
applied for conscientious objector status.139
Mr. Casteel was able to point to a specific trigger: being an interrogator at
Abu Ghraib.140 Indeed, he could pinpoint the exact moment his worldview changed:

123

Jennifer Percy, The Priset of Abu Ghraib, SMITHSONIAN.COM: AM. AT WAR (Jan. 2019),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/priest-abu-grahib-180971013/#ErrwxF8uUuvkFxfU.99.
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
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the prisoner’s rhetorical question.141 Furthermore, his high stress level was evident
from his yo-yoing weight fluctuations and cigarette use.142 Mr. Casteel could further
show this stress was caused by his conflicted morality, as shown by him starting to
go to a chaplain after each and every interrogation.143 He also started to read books
about Christian pacifism.144 These are the kinds of life events that suggest a sincere
change (or perhaps in Mr. Casteel’s case, realization) of beliefs.145

B.

The Analogous Procedures for Religious Arbitration

These procedures can be paralleled with religious arbitration.146 First, the
burden of proof should be on the party seeking to escape enforcement.147 Like in the
military, the standard of proof should be clear and convincing evidence.148 The party
will have to show a change in his or her lifestyle that corresponds with the change in
beliefs, similar to Mr. Casteel’s story.149
Parties should identify triggering life events of such significance that they
Mr. Garcia, the former
reasonably may result in a change of beliefs.150
Scientologist discussed above, explained that he became skeptical once he “reached
the highest level in Scientology, where he said all of one’s past lives are supposed to
be easily recalled.”151 He was unable to recall his past lives.152 He also learned
money he donated had been misappropriated, which led him to believe the church
was a scam.153
The party may also have to call expert witnesses.154 In particular, religious
experts and mental health professionals would be useful.155 The experts would
testify to their opinions about the nature and sincerity of the beliefs; they would not
testify or even base their opinions on accuracy or implausibility.156
141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
See Michael Broyde, The Rise and Rise of Religious Arbitration, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/26/the-rise-and-rise-of-religiousarbitration/?noredirect=on (discussing the rise of religious arbitration).
147
See Bill Galvin, The Guide for COs in the Military, CTR. ON CONSCIENCE & WAR (Aug. 2019),
http://www.centeronconscience.org/images/stories/pdf/The_Guide_for_COs_in_the_Military.pdf.
148
See id.
149
Percy, supra note 123 (discussing Mr. Casteel’s story).
150
Id.
151
Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 45.
152
Id.
153
Scientologists Sue Church for Fraud, YOUTUBE: ACTION NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2nZ9nJQqGU.
154
See Galvin, supra note 147.
155
See id. (discussing other elements of the process).
156
See id.
142
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The religious arbitration literature already contains one idea that might be
helpful in this inquiry. Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd noted when Ontario
was considering a ban on religious arbitration, “Part IV of the Family Law Act
should be amended so that if a co- habitation agreement or marriage contract
contains an arbitration agreement, that arbitration agreement is not binding unless it
is reconfirmed in writing at the time of the dispute and before arbitration occurs.”157
A pre- verse post-dispute distinction is one factor to consider in a religious sincerity
determination because the amount of time between the agreement’s origin and the
dispute correlates with the probability of a change of belief.158 Furthermore, a party
would probably have to raise the argument before arbitration. A mere challenge to
an arbitration award, after one has lost, seems much less sincere.
The exact nature these inquiries could take is hard to pin down. As the
military regulations acknowledge, religious sincerity determinations do not lend well
to any particular criteria.159 Although the lack of objective criteria is problematic, it
is no more problematic in the context of religious arbitration than in the context of
the military.
V.
SOME ELEPHANTS IN THE ROOM: OPENING A FLOODGATE AND THE
RELIGIOUS QUESTION DOCTRINE
This Part addresses two counterarguments. First, will permitting some
parties to escape religious arbitration on the ground that they changed beliefs open a
floodgate? Second, why does the religious question doctrine not apply?

A.

Empirical Data on Conscientious Objectors

One of the primary objections to using religious sincerity as an escape from
religious arbitration agreements might be that it would be too easy for parties to
disregard their obligations.160 However, the empirical data for military conscientious
objectors suggests this argument does not hold water.161
The Government Accountability Office created a report in 2007 on the

157

MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION
(2004), https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary.html; see
also Birdsell, supra note 14, at 542 (noting a “traditional objection[] to religious arbitration . . . [is] predispute pressure to choose religious arbitration”).
158
Id. (discussing examples of religious arbitration techniques in other contexts that can be used in the
military context).
159
See Question 5: Assessing Sincerity, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY (last visited Sept. 12, 2019),
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/question-5-assessing-sincerity (discussing the difficulty of
assessing sincerity).
160
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108.
161
Id.
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number of conscientious objectors in the military.162 As a preliminary matter, the
number of people who applied was quite small.163 The report summarized these
numbers
in
a
table
reproduced
below.164

162
163
164

Id.
Id.
Id.

140
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Table 1: Number of Conscientious Objector Applications Reported, Calendar Year
2002—2006 (Reproduced from the Report)165

Component

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Total

Army

25

47

53

33

23

181

Army
Reserve

2

8

14

9

3

36

Army
National
Guard
Navy

1

7

11

7

0

26

8

2

3

9

9

31

Navy
Reserve

0

0

0

0

0

0

Air Force

2

15

10

12

6

45

Air Force
Reserves

1

2

1

0

0

4

Air National
Guard

1

1

0

1

2

5

Marine
Corps

8

8

11

6

10

43

Marine
Corps
Reserve
Coast
Guard

7

21

14

5

3

50

1

1

1

0

0

3

Coast
Guard
Reserve
Total

0

1

0

0

0

1

56

113

118

82

56

425

165

Id. at 9.
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As Table 1 shows, the number of people making arguments that a change in
religious belief should relieve them from their contractual military obligations is
low.166
Furthermore, the threshold is high for servicemembers to receive
discharges.167
“[I]n order to be granted conscientious objector status,
servicemembers must submit clear and convincing evidence that (1) they are
opposed to participation in any form of war; (2) their opposition is based on
religious, ethical, or moral beliefs; (3) their beliefs are sincere and deeply held.”168
According to the report, the military branches took their obligation to investigate
seriously, with many investigations lasting close to a year.169 The approval rate
varied substantially from branch to branch: The Navy granted 84% of applications
while the Marine Corps and Coast Guard granted 33%.170 Across all branches,
applicants had about a 53% chance of their application being approved.171 These
percentages might seem high, but they must be considered in context: Few people
asked for them, and the military seriously investigated each time.172 From this pointof-view, the percentages seem low. In total, a mere 224 applications were approved
from 2002 through 2006.173 That means about forty-four applications were granted
each year. Keep in mind this was during wartime when, presumably, the number of
people seeking to leave the military each year should be high.174
To understand just how small these numbers are, the report noted there were
about 2.3 million members of the armed forces.175 This means about 0.00191% of
servicemembers actually seek and obtain conscientious objector status in any given
year.176 The report even stated the “number is small relative to the [size of the]
Armed Forces’ total force . . . .”177 “Since 2003, enlisted service members have been
leaving the military at a rate of roughly 250,000 each year . . . .”178 Thus, there is no
166

Id. at 6.
Id.
168
Id. (emphasis added).
169
Id. at 4 (“On average, the components took about 7 months to process an application for a
servicemember requesting conscientious objector status. The Air Force Reserve’s process typically took
the longest, at an average of nearly a full year (357 days), while the Navy’s processing time averaged
about 5 months (160 days).”).
170
Id. at 9.
171
Id. at 4.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 5.
174
See
generally
History.com
Editors,
Conscription,
HISTORY
(Oct.
13,
2017),
https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/conscription (discussing the history of draft evasion and
conscientious objectors).
175
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 108, at 1.
176
See id.
177
Id. at 3–4.
178
Anna Zogas, US Military Veterans’ Difficult Transition Back to Civilian Life and the VA’s Response, 2–3
(Brown
Univ.,
2017),
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/2017/us-military-veterans-difficulttransitions-back-civilian-life-and-va-s-response.
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small number of people seeking to exit the armed forces.179 In summary, the military
has not opened the floodgates by allowing conscientious objectors to leave.
While analogies are never perfect and should be taken with a grain of salt, it
seems procedures could be put in place, if found desirable, to allow those with
legitimate religious objections to religious arbitration to escape their contract without
causing a substantial impact on religious arbitration generally.180 Intuitively,
people’s motivation to lie about a change of beliefs is probably higher in the military
than in religious arbitration because servicemembers can potentially escape death
with such a claim. Non-legal pressures often make people submit to arbitration
agreements.181 Indeed, even before arbitration was mainstream, merchants would
submit to it out of fear that if they did not, it would hurt their reputation.182 As
discussed in the Introduction of this Article, one of the traditional objections to
religious arbitration is that it is too coercive—i.e., too many people submit to it,
sometimes even if they do not want to.183 Thus, it is unlikely that a flood of
people hoping to escape an arbitration agreement will arise.184

B.

The Religious Question Doctrine

The second elephant in the room for sincerity determinations is the religious
question doctrine. Those familiar with the religious question doctrine should feel on
edge after reading DoDD 1300.06.185 However, courts have, subject to much
criticism,186 distinguished between adjudicating a party’s religious sincerity and
deciding a religious question. Indeed, this Article has already explained multiple
examples of times where courts judged religious sincerity without even hinting at the
religious question doctrine. This Part does not argue that the distinction between
determining a religious question and determining religious sincerity is well-founded.
This Part merely explains the distinction to address plausible religious question
179

Id.
See id. (concluding this because of the small amount of servicemembers who seek to obtain conscientious
objector status).
181
See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 89 (showing an example of a non-legal pressure).
182
See id. (“Following merchant agreements, enforcement proved relatively simple, as ‘[p]ractices
developed among merchants to enforce arbitration awards; the failure to comply with an arbitrator’s
decision resulted in threats to a merchant’s reciprocal arrangements or to his reputation.’” (modifications
in the original) (quoting Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on
the Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 484 (1995))).
183
See id. at 233.
184
Indeed, one student note has suggested Mr. Walter’s argument is overstated in the context of disputes
involving ministerial employees because a legitimate and significant change of beliefs is unlikely. Birdsell,
supra note 15, at 544.
185
See DoDD 1300.06 (2017) (emphasis added).
186
See generally Chapman, supra note 22 (discussing the court and its role in adjudicating religious
sincerity).
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doctrine counterarguments to this Article’s thesis: that courts can inquire into
whether a party to a religious arbitration agreement has a sincere religious belief that
prevents them from participating.187
Professor Nathan S. Chapman recently published an article in the
Washington Law Review that “defend[ed] and clarif[ied] the sincerity
requirement.”188 Professor Chapman illustrated the religious sincerity confusion with
reference to the actions of comedian John Oliver.189 In 2015, Mr. Oliver started a
“church” called “Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption” to poke fun at how easily
televangelists could “receive unlimited donations tax-free.”190 Perhaps to Mr.
Oliver’s surprise, people donated thousands of dollars to Our Lady.191
“[Mr.] Oliver claimed the stunt was entirely legal . . . .”192 As Professor
Chapman explained,
[i]t wasn’t. Even considering the IRS’s fuzzy conception of
“church,” “Our Lady” was missing a crucial component of a
religious accommodation claim: sincerity. The scheme was,
of course, a parody. By attempting to expose fraud, [Mr.]
Oliver may have committed it.
[Mr.] Oliver is not alone in his confusion about the legal
relevance of a religious accommodation claimant’s
sincerity. The black-letter law is pretty clear, but scholars
question it and judges—including Supreme Court justices—
misunderstand it. The rule is simple: to qualify for a
religious accommodation, a claimant must demonstrate
sincerity.193
As Professor Chapman argued, religious sincerity is a question of mental
state and courts may inquire into that mental state “with one caveat: the Constitution
prohibits courts from inferring insincerity from a religious belief’s inaccuracy or
implausibility.”194

187
See Question 5: Assessing Sincerity, GEO. U. (last visited Sept. 12, 2019),
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/question-5-assessing-sincerity (discussing the difficulty of
assessing sincerity).
188
Chapman, supra note 22, at 1187.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 1191.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The state of mind of religious people has been conflated with religion
itself.195 This fallacy has allowed those opposed to religious arbitration to argue for
substantial restrictions on it.196 This Article is not intended to argue the pros of
religious arbitration. Religious arbitration has various merits, which have been
discussed comprehensively in other works.197 Professor Broyde’s book, for example,
has discussed these merits in detail.198 Chief among them is that parties to a contract
may have religious law in mind and part of contract law’s purpose is to enforce those
expectations, yet, civil courts are ill-equipped to determine religious law.199
Furthermore, religious arbitration is an aspect of some people’s faith.200 For
example, Jewish law emphasizes a duty to resolve disputes outside of secular
court.201 One Jewish religious-legal text explains,
In any place where you find gentile courts, even though their
law is the same as the Israelite law, you must not resort to
them since it says, ‘These are the judgments which thou shall
set before them.’ (Ex. 21:1) this is to say, ‘before them’ and
not before gentiles.202
By not enforcing a religious arbitration agreement, a sincere religious
believer may have to jump through additional hoops.203 In a sense, this harms that
person’s ability to practice his or her faith.204 A court considering a challenge to a
religious arbitration clause on the ground of a change in religion is faced with a loselose situation.205 Assuming the change in belief is sincere, one party’s freedom

195

See B ROYDE , supra note 2, at 233.
See Broyde, supra note 146.
E.g., Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels Incompatible with Law? Examining
“Overlapping Jurisdictions” in Private Law, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 367, 372 (2013) (“Private agreements
to arbitrate family disputes before religious tribunals should be enforced (so long as such agreements are
voluntary) for several secular reasons. First, enforcing such agreements advances legitimate state interests.
Second, enforcement of such agreements promotes freedom (of religion, speech, association, and
contract), and freedom is of fundamental importance to our constitutional democracy.”).
198
See B ROYDE , supra note 2.
199
See id.
200
For a detailed discussion of Jewish people’s belief that they should use a beth din for dispute resolution,
see Ginnine Fried, Comment, The Collision of Church and State: A Primer to Beth Din Arbitration and
the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633 (2004) (quoting a translation of TALMUD
BAVLI, TRACTATE GITTIN 88b).
201
Id. at 636 (quoting a translation of TALMUD BAVLI, TRACTATE GITTIN 88b).
202
Id. (quoting a translation of TALMUD BAVLI, TRACTATE GITTIN 88b).
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See id.
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See id. at 647-50.
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comes at the expense of another, regardless of how the court rules.206 Only upon a
substantial showing, as discussed in this Article, should a court allow freedom of
religion to trump freedom of contract.
It is worth briefly noting another relevant state of mind—bias. Recall Mr.
Garcia’s fight with the Church of Scientology discussed above.207 “The church
declared the Garcias ‘suppressives’ and excommunicated them, according to a legal
brief submitted by his lawyer.”208 Mr. Garcia pointed to a church doctrine known as
“disconnection,” which essentially required Scientologists to shun him.209 He
argued, because of the doctrine, the religious arbitration clauses were substantively
unconscionable given that he could not receive a “fair and neutral arbitration.”210
The court rejected this argument, stating,
[a]s compelling as Plaintiff’s argument might otherwise be,
the First Amendment prohibits consideration of this
contention, since it necessarily would require an analysis and
interpretation of Scientology doctrine. That would constitute a
prohibited intrusion into religious doctrine, discipline, faith,
and ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law by the court. Kedroff,
344 U.S. at 115. Indeed, Plaintiffs earlier acknowledged that
“[t]he hostility of any Scientologists on [the arbitration panel] .
. . is church doctrine.” . . . Accordingly, the court has no
jurisdiction to consider argument.211
Mr. Garcia’s attorney made a fatal error: framing the argument about bias in
terms of church doctrine.212 Instead, the argument should have been framed as
whether the particular arbitrators were biased. The court could have inquired into the
state of mind of the arbitrators without per se questioning religious doctrine.213 It
206

Notably, this argument is merely a form of one argument made by many others: Religious arbitration
promotes freedom of religion. See, e.g., id.
207
Supra Section II.B.
208
Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 45.
209
Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., No. 8:13-CV-220-T-27TBM, slip op. at 19
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015).
210
Id. at 19–20.
211
Id. at 20.
212
See id.
213
Contra Dasteel, supra note 23, at 57–58 (“Even if an arbitrator who is a member of the Church of
Scientology in good standing is required by church doctrine to have an adjudicatory bias against former
church members, there is nothing a court could do about it when the facially neutral Federal Arbitration
Act encounters religious doctrine. Indeed, even after arbitration, a litigant would have considerable
difficulty challenging an award based on bias because any such finding would require the court to
investigate the Church of Scientology’s doctrine concerning adjudication of claims with ‘suppressives.’ . .
. [U]nless the Scientologist-arbitrator makes some demonstrated outward display of bias, the Garcias
probably could not show actual bias. . . . If this had been a secular arbitration where the arbitrator was
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would have been similar to a religious sincerity determination.
For whatever reason, religious arbitration literature has not yet discussed the
powerful distinction between state of mind and religious questions. This distinction,
while a fine line, is seen prominently in other areas of law. State of mind, whether
sincerity or bias, should be considered more seriously going forward.

required to be a member of a secular organization and the rules of that organization required the arbitrator
to consider the parties to be ‘suppressive,’ the court would have little trouble in at least considering
substantive unconscionability. However, in the context of religious arbitration, it cannot do so on the
grounds of non-interference with religion.”).
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